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We propose a model of price competition where consumers exogenously differ in the
number of prices they compare. Our model can be interpreted either as a non–sequential
search model or as a network model of price competition. We show that i) if consumers
who previously just sampled one ﬁrm start to compare more prices all types of consumers
will expect to pay a lower price and ii) if consumers who already sampled more than one
price sample (even) more prices then there exists a threshold –the digital divide– such that
all consumers comparing fewer prices than this threshold will expect to pay a higher price
whereas all consumers comparing more prices will expect to pay a lower price than before.
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What we observe in daily life is that frequently homogenous goods are sold at differentprices by
different ﬁrms, i.e. we observe price dispersion. In a recent survey Baye, Morgan, and Scholten
(2006) report on dozens of empirical papers providing ample evidence in both on- and off-line
consumer good markets1 for Varian’s (1980) assertion that actually “the law of one price is no
law at all” .
The classic explanation for persistent price dispersion is provided by models where ﬁrms com-
pete on prices and consumers differ (either exogenously or endogenously) in the number of
prices they compare. Following the works of Wilde and Schwartz (1979) and Varian (1980), in
many of these models there are only two types of consumers:2 A fraction of consumers –the
informed consumers– compare all prices and buy from the ﬁrm offering the lowest price. The
remaining fraction –the uninformed consumers– just sample one price at random. The pres-
ence of these two groups of consumers implies that ﬁrms face a tradeoff between setting low
prices in order to attract a high number of informed consumers and setting high prices to rip
off the uninformed consumers. These two forces are balanced in a mixed strategy equilibrium
where ﬁrms randomize on prices, which can be interpreted as the theoretical equivalent of the
empirical observation of price dispersion.
Inmodelsofconsumersearchthedivisionofconsumersinuninformedconsumersandinformed
consumers arises endogenously as consumers decide on the optimal number of prices to sam-
ple. Burdett and Judd (1983) present a model where consumers have homogeneous search costs
and engage in optimal non–sequential search. In this setup consumers either ﬁnd it optimal
to sample only one price or randomize between sampling one and two prices. In the latter
case consumers endogenously divide themselves into uninformed and (partially) informed con-
sumers. Stahl (1989) presents a model of sequential search where a fraction of consumers has
zero search costs and samples all ﬁrms in the market, and the remaining fraction has positive
search costs and samples only one ﬁrm in the market. Janssen and Moraga-González (2004)
analyze the case of non–sequential search in the presence of consumers with zero search costs
1The recent rise of internet price comparison sites has not only eased consumer search but has made it also
much easier for researcher to collect data, hence the second wave in the literature.
2The survey by Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) reports on many more theoretical papers on price dispersion
and consumer search.
1and consumers with positive search costs. Naturally, consumers with zero search costs will
always sample all ﬁrms in the market. Depending on the search cost, consumers with positive
search will either randomize between not sampling (and not buying) and sampling one price
(and buying), or sample one price, or randomize between sampling one price and two prices.
In the present paper we study a model that allows for any degree of partially informed con-
sumers. Some consumers will only be visiting one ﬁrm, some consumers will be comparing
the prices of two ﬁrms, some of three ﬁrms, and so forth, obtaining a consumer search distri-
bution. Burdett and Judd (1983) already show existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium under
such a general consumer search distribution. In their model consumers with homogeneous
search costs ﬁnd it optimal to either visit one ﬁrm or to randomize between visiting one and two
ﬁrms.3 We assume that the consumer search distribution is exogenously given and remark that
any consumer search distribution can be justiﬁed as the result of consumers with sufﬁciently
heterogenous search costs engaging in optimal non–sequential search.
The ﬁrst advantage of looking at more general consumer search distributions is that we are able
to provide new insights into the structure of price dispersed equilibria by varying the consumer
search distribution. We ﬁnd that the only determinant for proﬁts and hence also for total con-
sumer welfare is the share of uninformed consumers in the market. That is neither the number
of ﬁrms nor the exact distribution of the informed consumers matters. For, a ﬁrm can always
set the monopoly price (i.e. the consumers’ valuation for the good) in which case it only sells to
uninformed consumers. As in a mixed strategy equilibrium all prices in the support of the equi-
librium price distribution have to yield the same expected proﬁts it follows that these expected
proﬁts will only depend on the share of uninformed consumers.
In line with the previous literature on consumer search we ﬁnd that lowering the fraction of
uninformed consumers tightens competition and lowers expected prices for all different types of
consumer. One might be tempted by this result to think that “more search” is always beneﬁcial
to all consumers. We show that this is not the case if already informed consumers start to
compare more prices. In particular we show that if already informed consumers start to compare
even more prices then there exists a threshold – the digital divide – such that everybody who is
3 Burdett and Judd (1983) also analyze the case of noisy search, where consumers decide whether to receive
an unknown number of price observations. See Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) for a model of noisy search
analyzing the welfare effects of price caps and advertisement.
2comparing fewer prices than this threshold will expect to pay a higher price whereas everybody
comparing more prices will expect to pay lower prices than before. In this sense, more search
by informed consumers inﬂicts a negative (pecuniary) search externality upon relatively poorly
informed consumer whereas it causes a positive search externality for relatively well informed
consumers. Figure 1 illustrates this point by means of an example.
A further advantage of considering general consumer search distributions is that it allows us
to put forward an alternative interpretation of the search model at hand as a model of price
competition on a network in the following sense:4 Firms and consumers represent nodes in a
bipartite network, i.e. a network where there are only links between ﬁrms and consumers. A
link between a consumer and a ﬁrm in this network indicates that a consumer observes the price
of this ﬁrm and may buy from this ﬁrm and that the ﬁrm may sell to this consumer. If we
assume that ﬁrms only know the degree distribution of consumers, i.e. the the probabilities that
a given consumer has one link, two links, and so forth, we obtain a network game of incomplete
information.5 Alternatively, we could also assume that the network is symmetric in the sense
that every ﬁrm faces the same consumer degree distribution and analyze this game of complete
information. Note that the number of potential consumers a ﬁrm can attract (i.e. its own degree)
may be different across ﬁrms, though.
Within this network interpretation the consumer degree distribution essentially plays the role of
the consumer search distribution in the consumer search model. In this sense, the equilibrium
we ﬁnd in the search context and the comparative static exercise of varying the consumer search
distribution translate into our network context. In particular, the comparative static exercise of
introducing more search can be interpreted as increasing the density of the network. We then
have that adding links to consumers who are only linked to one ﬁrm decreases expected prices
for all consumers, whereas adding links to consumers with already more than one link amounts
to a redistribution of social welfare from consumers who just have a few links to well connected
consumers.
This second interpretation of our model is related to the literature of competition on networks.
4Galeotti (2009) presents a model of search and word of mouth communication, where a network determines
the communication process.
5This incomplete information setup stipulates the use of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept for networks,
as e.g. in Jackson and Yariv (2007) or Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2009).











q=85, 3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0<
q
~
=85, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2<
Figure 1: The effect of already informed consumers engaging in even more search on the ex-
pected prices paid by different types of consumers. The k-th component qk of the ’search dis-
tribution’ q = (q1;:::q8) is proportional to the number of consumers sampling exactly k prices;
and pk denotes the expected price paid by such a consumer. ˜ q is obtained from q if two thirds of
the consumers who previously sampled two ﬁrms change to sampling eight ﬁrms. The solid line
connects the expected prices pk under the original distribution q and the dashed line connects
the expected prices ˜ pk under ˜ q. After this shift consumers who sample three or fewer prices will
expect to pay higher prices while consumers sampling more than three prices expect to pay a
lower price.
4Kranton and Minehart (2001) and Corominas-Bosch (2004) analyze bargaining situations be-
tween fully informed agents on exogenously given non–regular networks. These models how-
ever become soon very complex, untractable and with multiple equilibria, as the size of the
network grows. Blume, Easley, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2009) present instead a model with
uniqueness of equilibria, with sellers, buyers, and traders, where traders play the role of media-
tors and may set different prices to different buyers and sellers. Lever (2008) studies duopolistic
price competition under complete information on a network, where of course consumers may
at most have degree two.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 spells out the model. Section
3 presents the results and section 4 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a market for a homogenous good with N ﬁrms and M households (consumers),
and write m = M=N for the number of households per ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm can produce the good at
constant marginal cost, without ﬁxed cost, and sets the price at which it offers the good (all ﬁrms
set their prices simultaneously). Each household demands one unit of the good, up to a given
willingness to pay (assumed greater than the cost). Without loss of generality we normalize the
cost to 0 and the willingness to pay to 1 (the same for all ﬁrms, respectively households).
Households differ in the information they have about the ﬁrms’ prices. A household of type k
observes the prices of k ﬁrms and buys from the cheapest (randomizing with equal probabilities
in case of ties), provided the price does not exceed its willingness to pay. We denote by qk
the fraction of households of type k. The information structure is represented by the vector
q = (q1;:::qN), where of course qk ¸ 0 for all k and å
N
k=1qk = 1. We also refer to q as the
consumer search distribution or the degree distribution.
As already mentioned in the Introduction, there are two interpretations for this kind of model:
(1) non–sequential search: the k ﬁrms which a household of type k observes are a random
sample (with equal probabilities) from the set of all N ﬁrms; and (2) a bipartite network of
ﬁrms and households: a household and a ﬁrm can trade only if they are connected by a link.
A household of type k (degree k) has links to k different ﬁrms, and each ﬁrm faces the same
5degree distribution among its potential customers (i.e. the households to which it is linked). One
justiﬁcation of this particular kind of symmetry among ﬁrms is that the network itself might be
symmetric in the sense that each ﬁrm faces the same degree distribution but may in principle
attract a different number of potential consumers. Alternatively it could also be the case that
ﬁrms do not know the degree of each consumer they are linked to but instead only know the
degree distribution in the overall network.6 This incomplete information setup seems to be a
realistic approximation of situations where ﬁrms normally do not know the shopping habits of
each individual consumer, but rely their strategy on survey data representing the shopping habits
of average customers instead.
We will use both – the search and the network – interpretation interchangeably; in either case,
we obtain a strategic market game among the N ﬁrms, where we can take without loss of gen-
erality the strategy set of each ﬁrm to be the unit interval [0;1] (a price below 0 would generate
losses, and at a price above 1 nobody would buy). Trivial cases apart, we will see that this
game has equilibria only in mixed strategies, thus generating price dispersion. Our main inter-
est is the dependence of these price dispersion equilibria, and hence consumer welfare, on the
information structure q.
First we introduce some more terminology and notation. A household of type k = 1 is called
uninformed (or locked in in the network case), households of types k ¸ 2 are called informed
(also searchers or shoppers). The average number of searches (or links) per household is k =
Eq[k] = åkkqk; it is a measure for the intensity of search in the market (density of the network);
the number of links per ﬁrm is mk. For q = (q1;:::qN), deﬁne the auxiliary functions
j(x) :=å
k
kqkxk¡1 for x 2 [0;1]




j(x) for x 2 [0;1]
We have y(0) = 1, y(1) = k=q1, and y is continuous and strictly increasing in x.
The following known results are stated here for easy reference.
6See footnote 5.
6Proposition 2.1. A market game with information structure q = (q1;:::qN) has the following
equilibria:
(a) if all households are uninformed (q1 = 1), the only equilibrium is the monopoly outcome,
i.e. all ﬁrms charge the households’ willingness to pay (= 1).
(b) if all households search (q1 = 0), the only equilibrium (in which all ﬁrms are active) is
the competitive outcome, i.e. all ﬁrms charge the competitive price (= marginal cost =
0).
(c) If 0 < q1 < 1, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, but there exists a unique symmet-
ric equilibrium in mixed strategies: each ﬁrm chooses its price at random according to a
continuous distribution F(p) with support [pmin;pmax], where
















for pmin · p · pmax
(and of course F(p) = 0 for p · pmin, F(p) = 1 for p ¸ pmax). Moreover, the equi-
librium proﬁt per ﬁrm is p = mq1, and the average selling price (average household
expenditure) is pav = q1.
These results are known at least since Burdett and Judd (1983) (see especially the proof of
Lemma 2 there); for the reader’s convenience, we give a brief sketch of the proof of Proposition
2.1(c) in the Appendix. From now on, we focus on price dispersion equilibria and assume
always 0 < q1 < 1. The model is capable of generating a large variety of price distributions:
the density f(p) = F0(p) can be increasing, decreasing, constant, U-shaped, bell-shaped, W-
shaped, etc., depending on the information structure q. Fig. 2 exhibits a few examples7 (cf. also
Example 2.3).
Remark 1. The price distribution F does not depend on the numbers M;N of households and
ﬁrms, but only on the function y, i.e. (the nonzero components of) the search distribution q.
7 In labeling this and some later ﬁgures, we give ’search distributions’ q that are not normalized to sum to one;
replacing such q by q=åkqk converts them into probability vectors. Note also that the function y is homogeneous
of degree zero in q, so that the normalization of q does not matter in the formula for the price distribution F.
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Figure 2: Some densities f(p) for various q = (q1;:::;qK), with support [pmin;1]. The label
above each picture represents the search distribution (without the normalization åkqk = 1).
Dots "..." represent omitted zeros; in this case the length K of q is indicated by a subscript
(e.g. K = 20 in the last picture).
8The effective size of the market is given by K = maxfkjqk > 0g, the highest type actually
occurring in the population. Thus for a town with N = 50 gas stations, with q such that nobody
compares the prices of more than K = 10 stations, this model predicts the same equilibrium
price distribution as if there were only N = 10 ﬁrms (only the proﬁt per ﬁrm will be lower for
larger N). Intuitively, since every customer of a ﬁrm observes at most K ¡1 other prices, each
ﬁrm has only K¡1 effective competitors, and the model behaves like an oligopoly with K ﬁrms.
Thus, for given q (hence given K), we may take the total number N of ﬁrms as arbitrary (as long
as N ¸ K). Of course, this conceptual separation between changes in N and changes in q, while
analytically useful, is somewhat artiﬁcial: in practice, an increase in the number of ﬁrms may
lead to a change in search behavior.8 This is often assumed in the literature. For example in
models where there are households with zero search costs who always sample all ﬁrms, we
must have K = N, and a change in N implies a corresponding change in q.
Remark 2. The average selling price in the market depends only on q1, the share of uninformed
consumers. Therefore, changes in the search behavior of the shoppers can only have redistribu-
tive effects (beneﬁtting some types and hurting others), as long as q1 remains constant. One can
ask what the precise form of these redistributive effects is. Theorem 3.2 below gives a partial
answer. At this point we note only that it is hard to predict in general: for example, the change
from q = 1
60(10;27;20;0;0;3) to ˜ q = 1
60(10;38;0;0;0;1) changes the equilibrium price distri-
bution in such a way that types k = 1;2;6 pay lower expected prices and types k = 3;4;5 pay
higher expected prices (note that it is not clear whether q or ˜ q represents “more search"). See
Figure 3.




pdFk(p) (k = 1;:::N)
where Fk(p) = 1¡[1¡F(p)]k is the distribution of the minimum of a sample of size k from
the distribution F. It is easy to see9 that the expected price pk can also be written pk =
R 1
pmin[1¡F(p)]kdp. This implies the well-known fact that pk is a strictly decreasing, convex
8Lach and Moraga-González (2009) empirically analyze the effects of an increase in the number of gas stations










[1¡F(p)]kdp, where the last
equality follows by partial integration.









q=810, 27, 20, 0, 0, 3<
q
~
=810, 38, 0, 0, 0, 12<
Figure 3: pk resp. ˜ pk is the expected price paid by type k under search distribution q resp. ˜ q.
The picture shows the difference pk¡ ˜ pk. The change from q to ˜ q hurts the middle types.
10function of k (cf. Burdett and Judd (1983), p. 961). We write p = (p1;:::pN) for the list of
expected prices paid by the various types. Note that if N > K, we have expected prices pk
even for some types k > K, although there are actually no such consumers. Such a pk is sim-
ply what a (hypothetical) consumer would expect to pay if he sampled k prices from the given
distribution F.
The next lemma will turn out to be very useful for the comparative statics exercise presented in
the next section.













Using this lemma, we can check that the average of the pk’s is indeed equal to the average













du = q1 = pav:
We conclude this section with an analytically tractable example (where formally K = N = ¥).
Example 2.3. Suppose the information structure q is such that qk =Cak
k , for k = 1;;2;:::, with
0 < a < 1, and C¡1 = åk
ak
k = ¡log(1¡a). Then y(x) = (1¡ax)¡1. By Proposition 2.1(c)





with pmin = 1¡a, pmax = 1, and the density f(p) = F0(p) = 1
a is uniform on its support. The
expected price for a household of type k is pk = 1¡ k
k+1a, by (1), and the average selling price




k . If a increases, also the probabilities that customers have more
connections increase, and expected prices decrease.
113. The Digital Divide
The boundary between households who have access to the internet and those who do not is
sometimes referred to as the "digital divide", and there is evidence that households above the
divide (with many links) pay lower prices on average than those below (see e.g. Baye, Morgan,
and Scholten (2003)). This is trivially true in our model, too, whereever we put the "divide",
simply because the expected prices pk decrease with k.
In what follows, we will demonstrate the existence of a much less obvious, but perhaps even
more deplorable kind of divide (which, for lack of a better term, we also call "digital"): if some
of those consumers who already search (have two or more links) begin to search even more
(in a certain well-deﬁned sense, see Deﬁnition 1 below), then the equilibrium price distribution
changes in such a way that all types below a certain threshold (our "digital divide") face higher
expected prices than before (in particular, the uninformed households always suffer), while
those above the divide face lower prices than before (Theorem 3.2).
That is, (a certain way of) increasing the information in the market (making the network denser)
favors only the high types, and harms the low types. Nobody here searches less than before,
but the increased activity of some produces a negative (pecuniary) externality for the others (the
low types who do not change their behavior). This is made precise in the following.
Consider two different search distributions q = (q1;:::;qN) and ˜ q = (˜ q1;:::; ˜ qN), and denote
the associated equilibrium quantities by F; ˜ F, pk; ˜ pk, etc.
Definition 1. ˜ q has fewer low types and more high types than q if there exists a threshold type `,
1 · ` < N, such that
˜ qk · qk for k < `; ˜ q` < q`; ˜ qk ¸ qk for k > `:
In this case, we write ˜ q Â` q or simply ˜ q Â q, and say that households search more under ˜ q than
under q.
REMARK. The concept just introduced is stronger than ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, i.e.
˜ q Â q implies ˜ q FOSD q, but not vice versa. Here ˜ q FOSD q means that ˜ q1+¢¢¢+ ˜ qk · q1+
¢¢¢+qk for all k = 1;:::N. It is easy to see that if ˜ q FOSD q and ˜ q 6= q, then ˜ k > k and hence
pmin > ˜ pmin. Therefore this last inequality is also implied by ˜ q Â q.
12We want to see what happens to the expected prices pk if households search more in the sense
of Deﬁnition 1, and consider the following two cases in turn. First, we consider the case when
uninformed consumers start to compare more prices, and second, we consider the case when
already informed consumers compare more prices.
Uninformed Consumers begin to search. Consider ﬁrst the case that only the uninformed house-
holds (type 1) search more. This means that ˜ q1 < q1 and ˜ qk ¸ qk for all k ¸ 2, i.e. ˜ q Â1 q.
Here we ﬁnd, in line with the previous literature:
Theorem 3.1. Assume ˜ q1 < q1 and ˜ qk ¸ qk for all k ¸ 2, i.e. ˜ q Â1 q. Then ˜ pk < pk for all k.
Proof. Obviously the assumption implies that ˜ qk=˜ q1 ¸ qk=q1 for all k, with strict inequality
for some k, so that ˜ y(x) > y(x) for all x 2 (0;1). This in turn implies ˜ pk < pk for all k by
equation (1). ¥
That is, if some uninformed households begin to search, the expected prices for all types go
down. The average selling price, pav = q1 also goes down. Intuitively, there is more search and
the market becomes more competitive.
Informed Consumers search more. Consider next the case that only the informed households
(types k¸2) search more. This means that ˜ q1 =q1 and ˜ qÂ` q for some `¸2. Here the situation
is not so transparent: there is also “more search", but the average selling price pav = q1 = ˜ q1
remains the same. This suggests (but does not prove) that not all prices pk can go down. Our
main result is the following.
Theorem 3.2. Assume ˜ q1 = q1 and ˜ q Â` q for ` ¸ 2. Then there exists a number d, d > 1 such
that ˜ pk > pk for k < d and ˜ pk < pk for k > d.
Proof: see Appendix.
We call d the digital divide. All types below the digital divide pay higher expected prices, and
all types above it pay lower expected prices. In particular, the uninformed households (k = 1)
always suffer because d > 1. For example, in Figure 4 we can take d = 10:5. It may be that
d > K, i.e. there are actually no consumers above d. In this case, all types k of consumers with
qk > 0 will expect to pay a higher price, see example 3.3.











q=8100, 10, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 50, 0, 0, 1<
q
~
=8100, 10, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 50, 0, 1<
Figure 4: The Digital Divide: pk resp. ˜ pk is the expected price paid by type k under search
distribution q resp. ˜ q. The picture shows the difference ˜ pk ¡ pk. We have ˜ q1 = q1, ˜ q Â q, and
the change from q to ˜ q causes all prices pk with k < d = 10:5 to increase, and all pk with
k > d = 10:5 to decrease. Note that the size of these price changes need not be monotonic: e.g.
p3 increases more than both p1 and p5.
14It is important to realize that ﬁrms’ proﬁts and hence also total consumer welfare depend only
on the fraction of uniformed consumers. More search by already informed consumers does not
affect total consumer welfare. However, it amounts to a redistribution of consumer welfare from
relatively uninformed consumers to relatively informed consumers. In this sense, more search
by informed consumers imposes a negative externality on relatively uninformed consumers and
may impose a positive externality on highly informed consumers.
As noted above, we ﬁnd that the number of ﬁrms does not affect consumer welfare either (as
long as the search distribution q does not change). Increasing the number of ﬁrms just results
in lower proﬁts per ﬁrm, leaving the industry’s proﬁts and hence also consumer welfare unaf-
fected. This is in contrast to previous work by Rosenthal (1980) who considers a model with
uninformed and fully informed consumers and shows that if new ﬁrms enter the market all
types of consumers will expect to pay a higher price. The driving force behind this surprising
result is the assumption that each new ﬁrm brings new uninformed consumers to the market.
As the number of ﬁrms increases also the fraction of uninformed consumers in the market in-
creases and competition becomes less tough, like in our Theorem 3.1. Morgan, Orzen, and
Sefton (2006) and Waldeck (2008) also consider models with uninformed and fully informed
consumers and show that increasing the number of ﬁrms will decrease expected price for in-
formed buyers and increase expected prices paid by uninformed consumers. The main reason
behind this result is the assumption that the informed consumers always sample all ﬁrms in the
market. As the number of ﬁrms increases also the number of prices sampled by the informed
consumers increases. Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2006) and Waldeck (2008) show that in this
setup uninformed consumers will expect to pay a higher price and the fully informed consumers
will expect to pay a lower price, which can be readily interpreted in the light of Theorem 3.2.
We will now present an example where some consumers who previously compared two prices
start to compare three prices.
Example 3.3. Consider the case where consumers only sample at most three ﬁrms, i.e. K = 3
and consider the consumer search distribution q = (5;5;10). Using Lemma 2.2 we can nu-
merically compute the expected prices paid by the different types of consumers, obtaining
p1 ' 0:3761, p2 ' 0:2408 and p3 ' 0:1915. Suppose now that one consumer who previ-
ously sampled two ﬁrms samples now three ﬁrms, obtaining a new consumer search distribution
˜ q = (5;4;11). Computing expected prices under this new consumer search distribution we now
15obtain that ˜ p1 ' 0:3832 > ˜ p1, ˜ p2 ' 0:2434 > p2 and ˜ p3 ' 0:1919 > p3. In addition, we ﬁnd
that a consumer of type 4 would actually pay a lower price (i.e. ˜ p4 < p4), but there are no such
consumers represented in the population.
At a ﬁrst glance, the previous example seems to be in contradiction with the observation that as
the number of uninformed consumers is the same under both consumer search distributions also
the expected selling price has to be constant. This contradiction is however easily resolved if
one takes into account that the consumers who switched from sampling two ﬁrms to three ﬁrms
now pay a lower price, i.e. ˜ p3 < p2.10
It is clear from the above that if some shoppers search more they can exert a negative externality
on other households. Perhaps surprisingly, it is even possible that all consumers who search
more hurt themselves:
Example 3.4. starting from the initial search distribution q=(1;20000;0;0;0;10000), suppose
that all type 2 households switch to become type 3 (begin to compare three prices instead of
two), resulting in the new search distribution ˜ q = (1;0;20000;0;0;10000). We have ˜ q Â q and
˜ q1 = q1, i.e. the average selling price pav = ˜ pav remains the same, and one can check that
˜ pk > pk for k · 5 and ˜ p6 < p6 (the digital divide is d = 5). But even more is true: the expected
price ˜ p3 paid by the new type 3 households under distribution ˜ q is not only higher than p3, but
even higher than p2, the expected price paid by the same households before the change. Thus
the increased search by these former type 2 households beneﬁts only the highest type 6 in the
population, and actually makes those who search more worse off than before.
Note that the concept of “more search" introduced in Def. 1 is stronger than First Order Stochas-
tic Dominance. Regarding FOSD, we have:
Corollary 3.5. Assume q1 = ˜ q1, ˜ q 6= q, and ˜ q FOSD q. Then there exist thresholds 1 < d · ¯ d,
such that all types below d (resp. above ¯ d) pay higher (resp. lower) expected prices under ˜ q
than under q.
Proof: see Appendix.
In particular, the uninformed (type k =1) always suffer from an FOSD improvement among the
shoppers. We conjecture that Cor. 3.5 holds with d = ¯ d, i.e. the digital divide result in Th. 3.2
10Similar observations are known as Simpson’s paradox in statistics.
16remains true if "more search" is deﬁned by FOSD, but have not been able to prove this stronger
result.
Finally, if we assume only ˜ q FOSD q (but not necessarily ˜ q1 =q1), it is still true that sufﬁciently
high types pay lower prices under ˜ q, because the additional change from q1 to a (necessarily
smaller) ˜ q1 lowers all prices, by Th. 3.1. The effect on the uninformed of such a general FOSD
change is ambiguous: the reduction in q1 tends to lower p1, but the “digital divide" tends to
raise p1.
4 Conclusion
It has become widely accepted in economics that consumer welfare can be increased by making
the comparison of prices easier. If previously uninformed consumers start to compare prices
this is deﬁnitely the case. However, if already informed consumers compare more prices total
consumer welfare stays unaffected. Moreover, it will result in a redistribution of consumer
welfare from relatively uniformed to informed consumers.
The internet – and with it the onset of price comparison sites – has been largely praised by
economists and policy makers as a way to ease consumer search and thereby increase compe-
tition. Consequently, policies to improve internet accessibility, and to promote the use of price
comparison sites, are also seen as tools to increase consumer welfare. Whether such policies
are indeed beneﬁcial to all consumers is however questionable. Suppose there are three types of
consumers: those who are uninformed consumers, those who sample just a few prices, e.g. by
using newspapers ads, and those who rely on internet price comparison sites. If the uninformed
consumers are not affected by measures promoting search, total consumer welfare will remain
constant. Moreover, if partially informed consumers decide to become fully informed, then the
uninformed will expect to pay a higher price.11 Consequently, when trying to enhance com-
petition by easing the burden of comparing prices uninformed consumers should be targeted
ﬁrst.
Our ﬁndings are at the heart of the current political debate on broadband stimulus which turns
11As seen in Example 3.4, it is not even certain that the partially informed consumers will beneﬁt from such a
shift.
17around the question whether existing internet connections should be made faster or the internet
should be made accessible to a broader audience. The Economist argues that:
...But the case for large-scale government investment in broadband is not as strong
as its proponents claim. When it comes to promoting economic activity, it is easy
to see why having broadband is better than not having it, but most beneﬁts are
likely to come from wiring people up in the ﬁrst place rather than making existing
connections hum faster. ...(“Broadband Stimulus,” The Economist, January 31st
2009, Vol. 380, Number 8616, p12. )
Our model supports this viewpoint, as making existing connections faster would merely result
in a redistribution of welfare from poorly informed consumers to better informed consumers,
whereas wiring up new consumers would increase total consumer welfare.
5. Appendix
Sketch of Proof of Prop. 2.1(c).
First one establishes that the equilibrium price distribution F must be continuous and strictly
increasing on a support of the form [pmin;pmax] with 0 < pmin < pmax = 1 (otherwise, one can
easily ﬁnd proﬁtable deviations). Given this, we observe that every price in the support must
give the same (expected) payoff to a ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm charges pmax = 1 it gets only its share
of uninformed consumers, so p = pmax:mq1 = mq1 is the equilibrium proﬁt. If it charges pmin
it gets all households to which it is linked, so p = pmin:mk, hence pmin = q1=k. Total proﬁts
are Np and must be equal to total household expenditure Mpav, so pav = (N=M)mq1 = q1.
A ﬁrm charging any price p 2 [pmin;1] is observed by mqkk households of type k and makes a
sale to such a household iff the other (k¡1) prices observed by the household are higher than p,





mqkk[1¡F(p)]k¡1 = p:mq1:y[1¡F(p)] = p = mq1
This implies
p:y[1¡F(p)] ´ 1 (2)
18or F(p) = 1¡y¡1(1=p) ¥
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
The function x = Fk(p) = 1¡[1¡F(p)]k is one-to-one from [pmin;1] to [0;1]. Solving for p
gives the inverse function p = F¡1
k (x) as follows: (1¡x)1=k = 1¡F(p) = y¡1(1=p) (by





It is geometrically obvious that the areas in the unit square to the left and to the right of the graph
of Fk (which is the same as the graph of F¡1









































The proof of Theorem 3.2 is preceded by some lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. Assume ˜ q1 = q1 and ˜ q Â` q, 2 · ` < N. Then there is a number b 2 (0;1) such
that ˜ y(x) < y(x) for x 2 (0;b) and ˜ y(x) > y(x) for x 2 (b;1].
Of course, by continuity, ˜ y(b) = y(b), i.e. ˜ y and y cross only once in (0;1], at the point b.
Proof of Lemma 5.1: Since ˜ q1 = q1 > 0, it sufﬁces to prove the assertion for j = q1y. By
assumption, qk¡ ˜ qk ¸ 0 for k < `, q`¡ ˜ q` > 0, and qk¡ ˜ qk · 0 for k > `.
19We know that j(0)¡ ˜ j(0) = q1¡ ˜ q1 = 0 and j(1)¡ ˜ j(1) = k ¡ ˜ k < 0. For 0 < x · 1 we have


















xl¡k +`(q`¡ ˜ q`)






is strictly increasing in x (because at least one coefﬁcient k(˜ qk¡qk) must be positive), and tends
to zero for x ! 0. Therefore the function f(x) := A(x)¡B(x) is strictly decreasing on (0;1],
positive for x near zero, and negative for x = 1 (because j(1)¡ ˜ j(1) < 0). This implies the
assertion. ¥
Lemma5.2. Letg(x)beanonnegativecontinuousfunctionontheinterval [0;1]whichisstrictly





















for i = 1;2;:::
(obviously Ai, Bi are always positive).
Intuitively, the distribution Hi(x) = xi on the interval [0;1] has more weight on the right if i
increases, hence Bi should increase relative to Ai (one might also think that Bi ¡Ai increases
in i, but one can show by examples that this is not true in general).
Proof of Lemma 5.2: Fix b 2 (0;1) and i ¸ 1. For any n ¸ 2 the integrals Ai and Bi can be













0 = y0 < y1 < ¢¢¢ < yn = b; b = z0 < z1 < ¢¢¢ < zn = 1
hj 2 (yj¡1;yj); zj 2 (zj¡1;zj); dyj = yj¡yj¡1; dzj = zj¡zj¡1 8j












are also all equal, i.e. bij = Bi=n for all j = 1;:::n.













jdyj; bi+1;j := g(zj)(i+1)zi
jdzj:
By choosing n is sufﬁciently large, we can make ˜ Ai+1 resp. ˜ Bi+1 arbitrarily close to Ai+1 resp.
Bi+1 (because g is continuous and all possible Riemann sums converge to the same integral if





















By construction, zj=hj > zj¡1=yj ¸ min1·i·nfzi¡1=yig =: l > 1 (recall n ¸ 2). Moreover, if
we proceed to a ﬁner partitioning, replacing n by n0 = n+1 (with the same properties as above,
i.e. all summands a0
ij resp. b0
ij are equal), then y0
j < yj and z0





j > zj¡1=yj ¸ l > 1.











21Therefore ˜ Bi+1= ˜ Ai+1 >lBi=Ai and, since ˜ Bi+1= ˜ Ai+1 !Bi+1=Ai+1 asn!¥, weobtainBi+1=Ai+1 ¸
lBi=Ai > Bi=Ai. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
Let ˜ q1 = q1, ˜ q Â` q, 2 · ` < N, and denote by pk resp. ˜ pk the expected price paid by a type k









By Lemma 5.1, there is a point b, 0 < b < 1, such that h(x) < 0 for 0 < x < b and h(x) > 0 for
b < x < 1. Therefore, by equation (1):






0 jh(x)jdxk, Bk =
R 1
b jh(x)jdxk. The function g(x) := jh(x)j satisﬁes the assump-
tions of Lemma 5.2, hence Bk=Ak increases strictly with k. Thus, if pm ¡ ˜ pm = Bm ¡Am > 0
for some m, so that Bm=Am > 1, we have also Bk=Ak > 1, hence pk ¡ ˜ pk = Bk ¡Ak > 0 for all
k ¸ m. In other words, if the expected price decreases for some type m, then also for all higher
types.
Denote by d the lowest type for whom the expected price does not increase, i.e. d is the ﬁrst
index such that pd ¸ ˜ pd.
We know that ˜ pmin < pmin, therefore ˜ pN < pN for N sufﬁciently large (because a household who
searches long enough must ﬁnd a price arbitrarily close to the minimum); thus d < ¥.
It remains to show that d > 1, i.e. not all prices go down. Using vector notation, write q¢ p =
åkqkpk. Then the expected average prices satisfy
˜ q1 = ˜ pav = ˜ p¢ ˜ q = q1 = pav = p¢q (4)
Moreover, the components of p = (p1;:::pN) are strictly decreasing and ˜ q FOSD q. Therefore
˜ q¢ p < q¢ p. If all prices ˜ pk were less than pk, we should have ˜ p · p, hence ˜ q¢ ˜ p · ˜ q¢ p < q¢ p,
contradicting (4). ¥
Proof of Cor 3.5.
A search distribution q = (q1;:::qN) can equivalently be represented by its cumulative distribu-
tion Q = (Q1;:::QN), where Qk = q1+:::qk for k = 1;:::N (of course Q1 · Q2 · :::QN = 1).
22Write ˜ Q Â Q iff ˜ q Â q. Now assume ˜ q1 = q1, ˜ q 6= q, and ˜ q FOSD q. i.e. ˜ Qk · Qk 8k. Write
Q = (Q1;:::QN), ˜ Q = ( ˜ Q1;::: ˜ QN) and deﬁne Q1 = Q, and Q` = ( ˜ Q1;::: ˜ Q`¡1;Q`;:::QN) for
2 · ` · N. Then QN = ˜ QN and each Q` is obtained from Q`¡1 by shifting the nonnegative
mass d` = Q`¡ ˜ Q` of consumers from type `¡1 to type `, i.e. Q` Â Q`¡1 (or Q` = Q`¡1) for
` = 2;:::N. Each move from Q`¡1 to Q` either leaves all prices unchanged (if Q` = Q`¡1), or
it creates a digital divide d` > 1, raising expected prices for the types below d` and lowering
prices for the types above d`, by Th. 3.2. Since ˜ q 6= q, such a change occurs at least once.
Putting d = min(d`), ¯ d = max(d`) gives the assertion of the Corollary. ¥
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